[Picture: Ahmed al Shara, known as al-Julani, as the Emir of al Nusra, and more recently as the liberator of Syria]

In a lightning move, Syrian rebels charged down from their small territory in northwestern Syria. In ten days they captured the major cities of Syria: first Aleppo, then Hama and Homs, before victoriously entering Damascus. The fifty-year Assad rule had suddenly come to an abrupt end.

Bashar al-Assad loaded his family onto an airplane at six a.m. and flew off to safety in Russia. The rebel leader, Mohammad Abu al-Julani, marched triumphantly through the streets of the capital city. Syria was free.

But free for what?

The origins of the rebel movement, Hamat Tahrir al-Sham – HTS, “the organization for the liberation of al-Sham” (Syria, Iraq, and adjacent regions, also known as the Levant) — are in al Nusra. It was one of many groups that surfaced in response to the Arab Spring uprising against the Assad regime in 2012. It then quickly affiliated with al Qaeda.

Another movement in Syria, the Islamic State led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was also affiliated with al Qaeda. In an effort to create solidarity between them, the al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri commanded Baghdadi’s group to merge with al Nusra. Baghdadi refused. He broke with al Qaeda and went on to create the powerful Islamic State that dominated eastern Syrian and western Iraq for several years.

The al Nusra movement in time also tired of its association with al Qaeda. In 2016, the young leader of al Nusra, Ahmed al-Shara, known by his nom de guerre, Mohammad al Julani, broke ranks with what remained of al Qaeda after Osama bin Laden’s death. He downplayed the jihadi rhetoric in favor of an emphasis on the national liberation of Syria from the Assad regime. This enabled him to forge a new coalition of rebel groups under the banner of HTS.

So now that the 42-year-old former jihadi militant is now the new leader of Syria, the question is what will he do? What is next for Syria?

Unification is part of the agenda. Al Shara (formerly known as Julani) represents a tiny sliver of the Syrian population. His movement is aligned with Sunni Arabs, who constitute the majority of the country, so that will help. But Sunni Arabs are hardly a unified constituency. Then there is a sizeable percentage of Syrian Christians and Alawites (a Shi’a offshoot) along the Mediterranean coast. Kurds control vast sections of the northern and western parts of the country. ISIS is still present and still bitter over their break up with al Nusra years earlier. Also there are former al Nusra supporters who refused to go along with the moderating style of Shara and formed their own militant cell.

Gaining the support of all these groups, even their tacit accession to HTS’s power, will be challenging. Then there is the need to reconstitute the government after decades of dictatorial rule. Will Shara simply slide into office as the newest dictator, or will there be an effort to reform the governmental process? Does democracy stand a chance?

We will be waiting to get answers to these questions. So far Shara has appeared to be conciliatory. He has assured Shi’a that their sacred shrines will be protected and has promised Syrian Christians and Alawites safety. He has ordered his armed forces to protect government buildings and keep them from being looted, and he has allowed the Prime Minister –who stayed in Damascus after Assad fled—to continue the functioning of government until there is a transition.

But a transition to what? Now that he is in power, will Shara return to his old jihadi ideology and try to impose his own idea of an Islamic State? There are several possibilities:

The ISIS model. Shara could assume he has a mandate to recreate Syria around his own ideology and impose a dictatorship and a rigid Islamic order.

The Saudi model. He could declare Syria to be an Islamic state and impose an autocratic regime while allowing some flexibility in rigid Islamic codes of behavior.

The Iranian model. He could try to resuscitate the trappings of democratic rule while maintaining a fairly conservative Islamic social order.

The Iraq model. His movement could constitute itself as an Islamic-leaning political party and contest elections, negotiating with other parties to create a coalition government.

The Ukrainian model. Shara could emerge as a nationalist hero, admired by all sides, and put his ideology aside while he created a new democratic order.    

While Western observers yearn for the last outcome, it will probably be some variant of the other ones. The hope is that whatever form of polity and social order emerges out of the new regime it will not lead to chaos and even more bloodshed. The Syrian people have had enough of both. They deserve better.