
It seems that the whole world has celebrated the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas. And justly so. There is much to celebrate – after two bloody years of destruction in Gaza and the enduring captivity of the Israeli hostages the guns were silenced. The hostages—those still alive—came home. Thousands of Palestinian prisoners were released.
How did it happen? And who should claim the credit?
We know the answer to the second question, since US President Donald Trump was lauded in the Israeli Knesset and his face plastered on billboards in Tel Aviv. He has not been shy about claiming that he alone was the peacemaker in this historic moment.
But something about that explanation doesn’t seem quite right. I’ve studied how conflict ends, especially those bitter encounters involving non-state religious terrorist movements. In my book, How God Stops Fighting: How Religious Violence Ends, I have taken a deep dive into the mindset of the militants in ISIS and other movements to understand how they saw the ending of their military encounters.
It was not defeat on the battlefield. And it was not through the mediation of an outside party.
Invariably the movements were weakened from within. Internal conflict and the erosion of confidence in leadership were critical. Equally important was the diminishing of support from the general population that had previously given militant movements legitimacy and cooperation.
These factors may also have played a role in the cease fire agreement signed by Israel and Hamas. It is true, however, that outside mediators can play a role.
Take the case of Northern Ireland. The so-called “Troubles” between the militant Northern Irish IRA and the Protestant Unionists in the region had lingered for decades of cruelty and terror with no end in sight. The Good Friday agreement in 1998 brought an end to the fighting.
A key player in the negotiations was an outsider, U.S. Senator George Mitchell. He spent months on the ground, helping to craft the agreement and serving as a mediator between both sides. Though his role was valuable, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded not to Mitchell but to the leaders of the Catholic and Protestant sides who signed the accords.
Recognizing Mitchell’s useful role in the Northern Ireland situation, President Barack Obama dispatched him to Israel to be a mediator in its conflict with their Palestinian territories. After some months, Mitchell gave up the task. They were not ready for peace, he lamented.
So why was Hamas and the Israeli government ready for peace in October 2025? After all, the 22-point peace agreement that Trump forwarded was essentially the same as the one proposed during the previous administration of President Joe Biden.
But a lot can happen in a year. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was increasingly hammered by an angry Israeli population weary of war and eager for the return of the last of the hostages. The longer the fighting continued the more likely that Israeli hostages would be killed in Israeli attacks along with thousands of Palestinians. Netanyahu was constrained, however, by extremists in his own cabinet who wanted all Palestinians to leave and allow for an expanded “biblical Israel.”
Hamas leadership had been seriously degraded by Israeli military actions. Moreover, the movement’s closest allies—Hizbollah, Houthis, and Iran—had all been crippled by Israeli attacks. Within Gaza opposition to Hamas was building, united around several old Palestinian families who provided bases of resistance to the movement.
Hence the pattern that I had observed in the ending of ISIS and other militant conflicts was replicated in the case of Hamas and Israel. But each needed a reason to placate the extremists in their ranks and urge them into a cease fire agreement.
That’s where Trump stepped in. Though there was nothing new about the terms of the agreement, each side could point to his insistence as the factor that necessitated a now-or-never deal. He helped to create the impression that this would be the best that could get out of a difficult situation, and if they did not seize the opportunity, it would be grinding conflict with no end in sight.
The time had come. The momentum for closure was building. Internal squabbling on both Hamas and Israeli government sides had increased, their popular support had significantly eroded, and neither side had much to gain by protracted struggle. And they had Trump to use as an argument to persuade the extremists in their own camps.
If Trump secretly held out large sums of money to help Gaza rebuild and Israel to maintain its military strength, that would have been further incentive. After all, with all Trump’s cut-backs in government operations and services and huge new consumer taxes brought about by tariffs, he had plenty of money to throw around. He gave 20 billion to an Argentinian autocrat to prop up his failing economy just because he liked him. He could certainly spare that for Gaza.
Whether the cease fire is a temporary thing or will lead to lasting peace is an open question. Hamas has regained strength and is executing Gaza residents who collaborated with the Israeli enemy. Now that the hostages have returned, Netanyahu can return to Gaza with a militant vengeance if he desires.
For a time, however, the world celebrates the silencing of guns and bombs. However it came about, it is welcomed. And in the best of scenarios, it could be a time for new beginnings.